Engaging English Speaking Facebook Users in an Anti-ISIS Awareness Campaign by Speckhard, Dr. Anne et al.
Journal of Strategic
Security
Volume 11 | Number 3 Article 4
Engaging English Speaking
Facebook Users in an Anti-ISIS
Awareness Campaign
Dr. Anne Speckhard
annespeckhard@icsve.org
Ardian Shajkovci
International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism, shajkovciardian@gmail.com
Claire Wooster
Neima Izadi
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss
pp. 52-78
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Strategic Security by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more
information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Recommended Citation
Speckhard, Dr. Anne; Shajkovci, Ardian; Wooster, Claire; and Izadi,
Neima. "Engaging English Speaking Facebook Users in an Anti-ISIS
Awareness Campaign." Journal of Strategic Security 11, no. 3 (2018) :
52-78.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.3.1679
Available at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol11/iss3/4
Engaging English Speaking Facebook Users in an
Anti-ISIS Awareness Campaign
Author Biography
Anne Speckhard, Ph.D. is Adjunct Associate Professor of Psychiatry at
Georgetown University in the School of Medicine and Director of the
International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE) where
she heads the Breaking the ISIS Brand Counter Narratives Project. Dr.
Speckhard has interviewed nearly 600 terrorists, their family members
and supporters in various parts of the world including Gaza, West Bank,
Chechnya, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, the Balkans and many countries in
Europe.
Ardian Shajkovci, Ph.D. is the Director of Research and a Senior
Research Fellow at the International Center for the Study of Violent
Extremism. He is also an Adjunct Professor at Nichols College teaching
counterterrorism and cybersecurity courses.
Claire Wooster is a Junior Research Fellow at the International Center for
the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE).
Neima Izadi is an Administrative and Junior Research Fellow and
Administrative assistant at the International Center for the Study of
Violent Extremism (ICSVE).
Abstract
This article reports on The International Center for Study of Violent
Extremism (ICSVE’s) small-scale Facebook ad awareness campaigns ran
between December 7, 2017 and December 31, 2017 in the United States,
UK, Canada, and Australia. Two ICSVE-produced videos were used,
namely The Promises of ad-Dawlah to Women, featuring the testimony of
a Belgian female ISIS defector, and Today is the Female Slave Market in
ad-Dawlah, featuring a Syrian male ISIS defector who witnessed the
sexual enslavement of women by ISIS. The purpose of the campaign was
to reach as many English-speaking individuals in U.S., UK, Canada, and
Australia to drive engagement with the ICSVE-produced videos as well
raise awareness about the dangers of joining or considering joining a
violent extremist group like ISIS. The ad generated a reach of over 1
million and almost 604K video views. In addition to important
engagement and awareness metrics, the qualitative impact analysis of
generated comments was promising in terms of initiating important
This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security:
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol11/iss3/4
discussions on the dangers emanating from violent extremist groups like
ISIS.
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INTRODUCTION
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS/Daesh) became known for its 
unprecedented social media drive and recruitment on a twenty-four basis. 
Many of the thousands of the individuals from over 110 countries who 
joined the conflict zones in Iraq and Syria were recruited over social media 
networks and platforms. Despite losing its territory in Iraq, including much 
of Syria, the group continues to inspire homegrown and returnee foreign 
fighter attacks in the West and elsewhere. Its online propaganda on social 
media platforms, such as Facebook, WhatsApp, and Twitter, despite 
takedown policies, continues unabated, now using fleeting profiles but still 
successfully swarming those who show interest in the conflicts in Iraq and 
Syria (and beyond) and the jihadist cause with ISIS-related propaganda 
. In our interviews with a sample of over 100 ISIS defectors, prisoners, 
and returnees, we have learned about ISIS’ strong media presence 
especially on Facebook, namely the presence of recruiters, ideologues, 
and ISIS-produced propaganda videos that continues even today, despite 
monitoring and takedown policies. 
Western countries continue to be targets of high-end and high-volume 
ISIS-produced propaganda materials. Since the beginning of the Syrian 
conflict in 2012, 160 individuals in the United States were charged for 
ISIS-related terrorism offenses. A 2015 Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) report indicated the actual or attempted recruitment of over 200 
individuals residing in the United States since the onset of the Syrian 
conflict in 2011. The authors’ research indicates the prevalence of social 
media-based, as opposed to face-to-face, recruitment of individuals 
residing in the United States. Moreover, the most vulnerable to ISIS 
recruitment and seduction over the internet are U.S. male citizens, 
ages 18-20, though the most evidence suggests minor travelers as well. 
Evidence in UK, Canada, and Australia also suggests the vulnerability of 
young men and women to ISIS propaganda and recruitment. 
This article reports on seven International Center for the Study of Violent 
Extremism (ICSVE) produced Facebook ad awareness campaigns that ran 
between December 7, 2017 and December 31, 2017. Two of the ICSVE-
produced videos, The Promises of ad-Dawlah to Women and Today is the 
Female Slave Market in ad-Dawlah were used in the campaign. The former 
features the testimony of a Belgian female ISIS defector who had taken 
her young son to live in ISIS territory whereas the latter a Syrian male ISIS 
defector who witnessed the sexual enslavement of women by ISIS. The 
purpose of these awareness campaigns was to reach as many English-
speaking individuals in the United States, UK, Canada, and Australia (ages 
13-50 in the U.S., Australia, UK, and Canada; 18 and over for the Slave 
Speckhard et al.: Engaging English Speaking Facebook Users
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2018
53Journal of Strategic Security
© 2018 
ISSN: 1944-0464 
eISSN: 1944-0472
Engaging English Speaking Facebook User in an anti-ISIS Awareness Campaign
Market video) to drive engagement with the ICSVE-produced counter-
narrative videos and raise awareness about the dangers of joining or 
considering joining a violent extremist group like ISIS. Two ads (one for 
each video) were used in every region, except for Australia, where we ran 
only one ad. In total, these Facebook ads generated a reach of 1,048,133 
with 604K video views, which are further discussed in the ensuing 
sections.
CAMPAIGN TYPE 
Awareness campaigns have historically been initiated to raise awareness 
about domestic abuse, depression, alcohol abuse, gender-based violence, 
and HIV prevention.  They are used to 1) promote a cause, 2) raise 
awareness or knowledge about a pressing social issue, and 3) reach and 
target a specific audience to deliver a message that is specific, unique, 
and pertinent to the target group. Awareness campaigns are especially 
powerful if used for early detection and intervention. In other words, they 
are especially powerful if the goal is to explain what can be gained by 
changing a specific behavior as well as what can be lost by not doing so. 
In the realm of counter-terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism 
(CVE), awareness campaigns (for example, community, youth, and 
internet-based) are crucial to understanding how individuals may 
become radicalized and mobilized to violence. A U.S. Department of 
State led initiative, Peer2Peer (P2P), represents a series of examples 
of CVE awareness campaigns. In addition to raising awareness about 
violent extremism, the P2P initiative also serves as an important platform 
to discuss issues related to CVE. Similarly, Quilliam, a UK-based CVE 
organization, launched #NotAnotherBrother and # NousSommesUnis 
awareness campaigns to fight the appeal of violent extremism. The 
latter campaign involved the release of a short counter-narrative video 
in the immediate aftermath of the November 2015 Paris attacks to 
raise awareness about violent extremism and highlight the need for 
unity between the West and Muslims, whereas the former the use of a 
counter-narrative video released on YouTube to counter ISIS and other 
violent extremist groups’ social media recruitment. In December 2017, 
the International Center for the Study of Violent extremism researchers 
launched a Facebook ad awareness campaign targeting Iraq, where 
Facebook remains the most widely used social media platform. The 
campaign led to 1.7 million views and hundreds of comments related 
to ISIS and counter-narrative message and strategy. Moreover, a group 
of former extremists created “Abdullah X,” an online Muslim cartoon 
character who was initially attracted to violent extremist rhetoric 
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espoused by groups like ISIS. The awareness campaign specifically 
targeted young and disillusioned Muslims who might be attracted to 
violent extremist messages. Our concurrent brand awareness campaigns 
initiated in other parts of the world. We considered the potential of our 
target audience (U.S., UK, Canada, and Australia) to come into online 
contact and be influenced by terrorist groups like ISIS and the level of 
exposure to environments that are supportive of extremist ideologies 
and facilitate recruitment into terrorist organizations. Strictly speaking, 
in the context of the first category, the authors have documented cases 
of individuals from the West and Western Balkans whose radicalization 
was deeply augmented, and in some cases entirely supported, by their 
exposure to terrorist content via the internet. While the majority of 
Westerners are not at a high level of exposure to environments that are 
supportive of terrorist ideologies, there have been increasing political 
tensions and social divides between Muslims and non-Muslims since the 
emergence of ISIS. This creates hotbeds of discontent. This may also 
facilitate recruitment. As learned during our Breaking the ISIS Brand 
interviews, we also considered processes by which individuals come 
to embrace violence, namely from simple online search to seduction 
involving both online and face-to-face persuasion to engaging in violence 
(See diagram below). This is not to suggest, however, that the process 
of grooming potential recruits online should be attributed solely to 
ISIS. In line with selective exposure theory, individuals, which could also 
be applied in the case of ISIS supporters and sympathizers, are likely 
to seek information that is aligned with their core values and beliefs. 
Selective exposure in social media platforms and networks can also lead 
to “audience enclaves,” or when individuals with deeply held convictions 
separate themselves from offline communities and condition the behavior 
of their respective community. This could also  increase the likelihood for 
online recruitment.
Figure 1. The process by which Individuals [Often] Come to Embrace 
Extremist Content Online.
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While terrorist groups in the past have relied on traditional mass media 
to spread their message and garner support, ISIS’ communication 
strategy differed in that it made use of the internet and social media to 
not only spread its message and garner support, but also to proselytize 
its followers. In discussing the relationship between social media and 
violent extremism, researchers have stressed the need to look at both 
the role of social media in facilitating spread of propaganda, support, 
and sympathy for ISIS and the effectiveness of social media, meaning the 
use of social media by violent extremist groups, in recruiting individuals 
online. For instance, some authors found a direct relationship between 
anti-Muslim rhetoric in Europe and the support and sympathy for ISIS on 
Twitter. Moreover, to build support, ISIS’ social media strategy focused 
not only on influencing its followers but also its rivals and journalists. 
Research indicates that popular social media platforms and networking 
sites increase ISIS’ reach and recruitment prospects, compared to “dark 
web” sites, for example, given the wide use of such platforms and the 
scale of extremist content consumption by users. Arguably, social media 
communication does play a significant role in providing support for 
violent extremism, though one must also consider different forms of 
online behaviors and offline events that can influence support for violent 
extremism. 
Compared to our recent Facebook studies focused on reaching audiences 
that were already highly supportive of ISIS ideology and have progressed 
further in the grooming process, in this  campaign consideration was 
given to individuals 13 and over who might be engaged with, or simply 
be exposed to, for the first time to extremist narratives online. This is 
crucial, as in the process, they may continue down the path of sustained 
engagement and exposure to violent narratives propagated by terrorist 
groups like ISIS. As ICSVE research indicates, it is on such platforms 
that they are likely to develop and form ideas. More importantly, it is on 
such platforms that they are likely to strike up relationships with terrorist 
recruiters who could lure them further along the terrorist pathway. Both 
prospects increase their susceptibility to violent ideologies and narratives, 
particularly in the wake of increasing tensions surrounding the conflicts in 
Iraq and Syria and/or Syrian/Iraqi conflicts in the West. 
Lastly, although we assume that the majority among the targeted age 
group in this campaign do not favor extremist narratives or would 
succumb to such narratives, the campaign serves as an invaluable 
opportunity for such protected target groups to access resources that 
openly target terrorist groups like ISIS. They can also use these invaluable 
resources to protect their more vulnerable peers. Given the easy sharing 
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and distribution mechanisms available on social media, they can also 
use them to use to educate and target those who might be vulnerable 
to such extremist narratives. Our hope was that by increasing awareness 
of dangers of joining ISIS and similar terrorist groups in this population, 
such efforts would lead to relevant discussions on the topic. We also 
hoped to observe changes in attitude that we would be able to measure in 
comments, as well as to changes in offline, real world behaviors, which are 
beyond our ability to measure using Facebook data alone. 
We chose demographic targeting based on location, age, and gender. We 
further narrowed our audience by interest categories that may indicate 
engagement with groups such as ISIS  such as: Al-Hijrah, Salaf, Caliphate, 
Mosul, Fiqh, Sharia, Ar-Raqqah, Hizb ut-Tahrir, Al-Aqsa Mosque, Hijrah 
(Islam), Martyr, and Salafi movement. Ages targeted were set to 13-50 
years old in the US, Australia, and Canada. In the UK, ages were set slightly 
older, at 18-50 for the Promises video and simply 18 and over for the Slave 
Market video.
Awareness metrics (reach, impressions, frequency, video views, and video 
retention), engagement metrics (clicks, likes, shares, and comments), and 
impact metrics (indicators of behavioral changes, metrics supportive of 
our ad, and comments) were applied as quantitative measures to analyze 
the data and comments were analyzed qualitatively to measure impacts of 
the awareness campaign. 
METHODOLOGY
Awareness, engagement, and impact metrics were applied to analyze 
the data. The campaign evaluation was rooted in both quantitative and 
qualitative metrics and standards already established by industry best 
practices and the authors’ research in conducting targeted interventions 
on social media platforms (See Table 1).
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Table 1
AWARENESS (QUANTITATIVE)—The total number of individuals viewing the 
content. This also includes demographic data on target audience
•	 “Reach” on Facebook and “Impressions” data on social media platforms
•	 Reach—number among the target audience who receive the impression of 
counternarratives on account screens.
•	 Impression frequency—the number of times target audience members 
access or see the counternarrative within a certain time. 
•	 Video views—the number of times our counternarratives were watched or 
played. 
•	 Viewer retention rate—Length (or percentage) of the video watched. 
Important at revealing at what point in the video a viewer’s attention might 
have been lost. 
ENGAGEMENT (QUANTITATIVE)—Volume and types of interaction with the 
counternarrative materials
•	 The number of times the video content shared
•	 Video specific engagements
o Viewer retention rate 
•	 Number of comments, link clicks, video “likes,” page “likes.” 
COMMENTS (QUALITATIVE)—A form of engagement providing a clearer indication 
on how viewers responding to the counter-narratives. 
o Supportive—comments in support of the video, characters 
featured in the video or the campaign in general. 
o Negative—comments expressing dislike towards the video, 
characters featured in the video or the campaign in general. 
o Misunderstood—comments (likely expressing negativity) due to 
misunderstanding content featured in the video. 
o Unrelated—comments that are unrelated to the video content, 
characters featured in the video, or the campaign in general. 
Spam content included as well. 
IMPACT ANALYSIS—A measurable change in the target audience’s behavior, 
knowledge, and attitude that could be directly linked to the online intervention. This 
could be measured via both qualitative and quantitative methods, namely:
•	 Comments
•	 Sustained engagements (for example, a user making more than one comment, an 
individual directly reaching the organization, and seeking direct treatment). 
•	 Sustained engagement further divided into:
o Sustained constructive engagement (for example, a user commenting 
positively more than once to the video content, character featured in 
the video, or the campaign. It can be interpreted as engaging in critical 
thinking.  
o Sustained antagonistic engagement (for example, a user commenting 
negatively or dismissing the content of the video the campaigners. It can 
be interpreted as raising doubts in the viewers’ mind. 
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AWARENESS METRICS
Geographic Location and Demographic Data
 Geographic Location
Campaigns targeted predominantly English-speaking regions. The United 
States, The United Kingdom, and Canada all received two campaigns – 
one for each video. Australia received one campaign for the Today is the 
Female Slave Market in ad-Dawlah video. The United Kingdom received 
slightly more specific targeting, specifically in Birmingham, Bradford, 
Leeds, London, and Manchester, primarily due to existing and potential 
spread of extremism in these areas. Cardiff was targeted in Wales for the 
same reasons. 
 Demographic Information 
Across regions, 25-34-year-olds were the most reached group at 35 
percent, followed by 18-24-year-olds at 28 percent and 35-44-year-
olds at 22 percent. The International Center for the Study of Violent 
Extremism’s (ICSVE) goal was to influence young adults primarily since 
they are the most vulnerable to ISIS recruitment, which is in line with the 
campaign goals. At the tail ends of the age spectrum, people aged 45 
and over made up 11 percent of overall reach, and 13-17-year-olds made 
up 4 percent. Interestingly, even though 13-17-year-olds made up only 4 
percent overall, they made up 18 percent of the reach specific to Australia. 
Other ads, which included that age group, only had them make up less 
than 2 – 4 percent, so the Australia campaign was unique in its greater 
ability to connect with minors. 
 Video Views as of 03/22/2018
The ICSVE Facebook ads campaigns generated a reach of 1,048,133, with 
604K video views. As we continue to experiment with these interventions 
in the future, we hope to further expand our reach, hone in our internet 
targeting, and increase the interest of our target audience, specifically 
among those who may be willing to act as influencers and magnify our 
impact. We also hope to reach to individuals that are more vulnerable 
and redirect them to our newly created website to engage in further 
discussion forums, watch additional videos, or gain access to other CVE-
related resources and materials. This could serve to further expand and 
strengthen the line of communication with them and lead to greater 
prevention and intervention efforts. We will also attempt to generate 
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enticing leads from those among those who believe in, are convinced of 
our work, and wish to help in the fight against ISIS. 
Today is the Female Slave Market in ad-Dawlah Total Views: 454K
Promises of ad-Dawlah to Women Total Views: 150K
Views include both videos that play due to the Facebook auto-play 
feature as well as due to clicks. In practice, given that Facebook videos 
often play automatically coupled with the fact that Facebook counts a 
view as any video watched for 3 seconds or more, any passive non-
watching would be counted as a view. However, when the ad played 
automatically, the average watch time across campaigns was 12.92 
percent (range of averages across campaigns = 7.04 – 17.98). This 
percentage is 27 seconds of 1 ad, and 19 seconds of the other, which 
suggests that even unintentional plays might have grabbed enough 
attention for viewers to see what the video was about before clicking 
away or stopping the ad. When users clicked our video to play, the 
average watch time across campaigns was 31.38 percent (range of 
averages across campaigns = 18.09 – 42.60). 
A more specific breakdown of watch time by individual ad is listed at the 
end of this report. 
Facebook Ad Access 
More people viewed our ads on an iPhone (261,313 total) than on an 
Android smartphone (166,276 total). Although a desktop was the third 
most popular device to access our ads, it only accounted for 22,559 
people. This compares differently from our campaign in Iraq for which 
Android was the predominant device in terms of accessing our videos. 
This data is crucial to further adjusting the targeting of our audience in 
terms of device and platform use. 
ENGAGEMENT METRICS 
In the previous section, we presented relevant metrics related to our 
video views. Awareness and engagement metrics such as viewer retention 
rate (percent watched) and viewer drop off rates are helpful in further 
adjusting our awareness campaigns. While the previous section served 
to mostly explain quantitative data related to our campaign, engagement 
metrics covered in this section offer a clearer indication as to if and how 
our Facebook ad resonated with our audience. 
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Together, the seven Facebook campaigns were responsible for 296,398 
ICSVE page engagements, including 349 new ICSVE page likes. In 
addition to our directly targeted audience, 16,589 people came across the 
ad by “word-of-mouth” (the ad came up in their news feed as something a 
friend commented on/reacted to/shared,). Of this group, 1,488 clicked to 
visit the ICSVE Facebook page, or to comment on, share, or react to the 
ads. This was all simply thanks to the engagement of our initial viewers. 
As one user commented, “I don’t like x, but I will share x,” illustrating that 
even those disturbed by our content found it important enough to spread. 
In total there were: 
•	 3,302 shares 
•	 1,079 comments
•	 3,247 reactions, including:
o 1,663 likes
o 903 angry reactions 
o 561 sad reactions 
o 58 wow reactions 
o 47 haha reactions 
o 22 love reactions 
As the qualitative responses to our campaign ad will demonstrate in the 
ensuing sections, coupled with the data presented above, our Facebook 
ad campaigns have led to a number of emotional responses to our videos. 
However, we must be careful not to attribute certain user behavior online, 
the 1, 663 likes in our case, for instance, as necessarily an indication of 
support for our campaign or videos. In other words, there might be among 
those who might have been motivated not by the content of our videos 
but rather morbid infatuation, curiosity, or many other factors. 
Three of our Facebook ads generated a relevance score of 10, two 
generated scores of 9, and two generated relevance scores of eight, 
as calculated on a 1-10 scale. The higher the relevance score, the better 
in terms of how our audience is responding to our ad. According to 
Facebook, “a relevance score is calculated based on the positive and 
negative feedback we expect an ad to receive from its target audience. 
It denotes both actual feedback and expected feedback. It is calculated 
based on a number of factors, such as the positive vs. negative feedback 
it is expected to receive. To demonstrate, video views, shares, and likes 
to constitute positive indicators, whereas the number of times our ad 
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is hidden, or number of times someone clicks “I don’t want to see this” 
on our ad, represent negative indicators. Before a relevance score is 
generated, our ad must have been served or shown 500 times (for 
example, 500 impressions are received). The relevance score is especially 
important to better identify our target audiences and use it for our 
campaign optimization. That said the relevance score is used to measure 
relevance of a campaign and not the quality of campaign. In other words, 
it is generated based on interaction and interest in our campaign. Despite 
its limitations, it is especially useful in understanding whether our target 
audience is considering our campaign and whether it is engaging with 
it. Our high relevance scores make clear that we are garnering audience 
engagement.
Positive feedback and negative feedback were both reportedly “ high” 
(out of the options “low,” “ medium,” or “high”) for every single ad. This 
means many people were estimated to interact with our English-speaker 
targeted videos, but many people also chose not to view it. This is typical 
of all ICSVE ads, especially those that receive higher relevance scores of 
8, 9, or 10. We will continue to aim for high relevance scores. That said, 
we would continue to reevaluate such scores depending on how well 
our campaigns are meeting our objectives of raising awareness about 
the dangers of joining ISIS. Moreover, it is not necessary to have high 
relevance scores as long as we meet expected campaign objectives of 
raising awareness about the dangers of joining ISIS. The following section 
contains a qualitative analysis of comments and discussions generated by 
our ads. 
COMMENTS AND QUALITATIVE IMPACT ANALYSIS 
Much of the data presented in the aforementioned sections were analyzed 
using descriptive quantitative methods. Comments to the counter-
narrative videos were analyzed used sentiment analysis technique. While 
relatively under-utilized in studies involving Facebook and social media 
in general, sentiment analysis proved instrumental in examining the 
relationship and association between most recurring themes, as well as 
classifying them into certain categories. The data selection and analysis 
process in comment section included:
1.  Exporting verbatim comments from the Facebook ad page 
and assigning corresponding IDs.
2. Counting the number of comments 
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3. Examining both manually and through use of sentiment 
analysis software (IntenCheck) responses and randomly 
reading 15 percent of them to get a sense of the themes that 
are likely to emerge. 
4. Sorting out applicable comments and cleaning out unrelated 
and repetitive responses. 
5. Coding and sorting out comments into respective 
groups 
6. Presenting and discussing data
Below represents a sample IntenCheck software output that monitored 
26 different categories (Seven group tones and communicative analysis) 
within comment section. 
Figure 2. IntenCheck software output.
Table 2
Category Grade Value Words Highlighted Words
POSITIVE LOW 6 102 able, above, acceptable, adequate, advantage, 
agreement, appreciation, beautiful, benefit, bett. . .
NEGATIVE VERY HIGH 100 155 against, allegations, anger, appalled, archaic, 
arguments, ashamed, attack, backward, bad, barb. . .
STRONG VERY LOW 0 133 able, act, adult, advantage, aggressive, agreement, 
army, assistance, attack, aware, benefit, b . . .
WEAK LOW 16 41 admit, apologize, ashamed, bum, common, crawl, 
death, depression, desperate, die, disgrace, dis . . .
ACTIVE VERY LOW 0 125 act, aggressive, alive, anger, argue, ask, assitance, 
attack, behavior, bet, better, bols . . .
PASSIVE VERY LOW 0 117 accept, admit, agreement, allow, appreciation, 
ashamed, aware, become, been, being, belief, bel . . .
ATTITUDE GROUP
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Sample Text Output Discussing Anti-ISIS Attitudes Using IntenCheck 
Software
“Those ISIS people are worse than any animals in the world. They 
are disbeliever and wrong do are. They are Devil or Satan. May 
ALLAH (GOD) destroy them or guide them toward right path. 
Ameen.” – U.S., Slave Market
“Barbaric savages I wouldn’t piss on them if they was on fire 
[expletive] Isis” – UK, Slave Market
“Make sure the [expletive] stay where they are and stew in their 
own expletive. Good enough.” – UK, Slave Market
“Brainless cave bastards!” – UK, Slave Market
“Horrible, horrible creatures…”
Sample Text Output Highlighting Negative Attitudes Using IntenCheck 
Software
 
“By this video they try to justify what she has done by showing 
her naive but joining a brutal terrorist group by itself is 
a crime against humanity. If she was offered what she was 
promised, then she was going to continue supporting IS? 
No sympathy towards those [expletive] at all” -UK, Promises
Sample Text Output Highlighting Anger Using IntenCheck Software
“COMPLETELY FAKE!! Islam doesn’t promote anything like this. 
I am Muslim, I treat my mother, sister, and wife as my queens 
and that’s what my holy book, the Quran teaches. As a Muslim I 
am against all this and it is obvious people that created this are 
further promoting their Islamophobic agenda onto others. Further, 
ISIS is to Islam as the KKK are to Christianity, no sane person would 
ask a KKK member about Christianity, and same goes with Muslims 
to ISIS. They are corrupt sects that spew hate, anger and have 
no intent but to create divisions amongst people» – U.S., Slave 
Market
Across all seven campaigns, there were 1,079 comments. About half (538) 
of these comments came from the UK Slave Market Campaign. Ads, which 
targeted Canada, received the least amount of comments for both videos. 
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However, when accounting for Reach, the ratio of people who saw the ads 
to people who commented is roughly the same across campaigns. Overall, 
the Slave Market video received more comments than the Promises video. 
Below is a more specific breakdown by campaign. 
Table 3
UK, Slave Market: 538 comments (Original: 351, Replies: 187)~9 comments/10,000 people reached
Australia, Slave Market:
192 comments (Original: 127, Replies: 65)
~17 comments/10,000 people reached
U.S., Slave Market: 133 comments (Original: 64, Replies: 69)~13 comments/10,000 people reached
Canada, Slave Market: 101 comments (Original: 59, Replies: 42)
~14 comments/10,000 people reached
U.S., Promises: 48 comments (Original: 24, Replies: 24)~8 comments/10,000 people reached
UK, Promises: 37 comments (Original: 25, Replies: 12)~7 comments/10,000 people reached
Canada, Promises: 30 comments (Original: 20, Replies: 10)~8 comments/10,000 people reached
Generally, comments fell under three categories: anti-ISIS, anti-Islam, and 
defense of Islam. The categories also often overlapped, since commenters 
against Islam and commenters in defense of Islam were both anti-ISIS. 
Notably, there were no explicit pro-ISIS statements. (This compares 
differently to our ICSVE YouTube channel comments in which there are 
pro-ISIS statements made much more frequently and where it is possible 
to comment anonymously.) However, many commenters attempted 
to discredit ICSVE’s videos. They claimed the videos were fake, the 
defectors were lying, and/or the videos were propaganda created to 
make Islam look bad. Though these comments might have been made by 
innocent individuals who felt the need to defend their religion, which they 
perceived to be under attack, the comments might also have been from 
ISIS supporters trying to discredit our videos. This is discussed in detail 
later in the report (see Regional Comment Trends section).
Below are some examples of the three larger categories: anti-ISIS, anti-
Islam, and defense of Islam comments and opinions.
Anti-ISIS and “Supportive Category” – Comments in Support of the 
Video, Characters in the Video, or the Campaign in General
“Those ISIS people are worse than any animals in the world. They 
are disbeliever and wrong do are. They are Devil or Satan. May 
ALLAH (GOD) destroy them or guide them toward right path. 
Ameen.” – US, Slave Market
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“Horrible, horrible creatures! They are evil and treacherous” – UK 
Slave Market
“Sick bastards” – UK, Slave Market
“Disgusting behavior and a complete mockery of the Islamic faith if 
they think this is acceptable” – UK, Slave Market
“What gives you the rights to take these women and use them as 
sexual slaves in a war? You are nothing but animals. You are not 
true Muslim people but you give your fellow Muslim people a bad 
name” – UK, Slave Market
Anti-Islam and “Misunderstood” Category—Comments Likely Expressing 
Negativity Due to Misunderstood Content Featured in the Video
“It’s a problem with Islam, not just ISIS” – US, Promises
“Eradicate Islam!”-Canada, Slave Market
“The true face of Islam” – UK, Slave Market
“Expletive Islam!” – UK, Slave Market
“Don’t you actually really know that Muslims really do use their 
children against anyone who opposes them....they strap bombs 
etc. on them so opponents have to be extremely cautious....their 
children have blown up soldiers in the past as well as themselves.” 
– UK, Slave Market
“What the [expletive] are you talking about? THIS IS ISLAM. This is 
what they promote. Taking 9-year-old girls as their bride is widely 
accepted throughout this disturbed [expletive] up religion. No 
Muslim man respects their wife” – UK, Slave Market
*In response to comment separating ISIS from Islam: “Learn to take 
criticism…London attack in tube, British parliament knife attack, 
Paris attack, Barcelona attack, Dhaka attack, blasts in Syria, Iraq 
etc. name it are not committed by Hindus, Jain’s, Buddhist Sikhs, or 
by Christian. These are on records.” – UK, Slave Market
“You can see real Islam here” – Australia, Slave Market
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Defense of Islam and “Negative Category” – Comments Expressing Dis-
like towards the Video, Characters Featured in the Video or the Cam-
paign in General
“This is not Islam. They’re using the religion for their own benefit.” – 
US, Slave Market
“[…] there is no evidence that Muslim should kill another person or 
make women of their slave.” – Canada, Slave Market
“COMPLETELY FAKE!! Islam doesn’t promote anything like this. I 
am Muslim, I treat my mother, sister, and wife as my queens and 
that’s what my holy book, the Quran teaches. As a Muslim, I am 
against all this and it is obvious people that created this are further 
promoting their Islamophobic agenda onto others. Further, ISIS is 
to Islam as the KKK are to Christianity, no sane person would ask 
a KKK member about Christianity, and same goes with Muslims 
to ISIS. They are corrupt sects that spew hate, anger and have 
no intent but to create divisions amongst people.” – US, Slave 
Market
Female Focused and “Supportive” and “Negative” Category 
Due to the focus of each ad – one about female enslavement and the 
other about the experience of a female defector – there were also many 
female-focused comments. This led to a trend of commenters engaging 
in culture wars in the comment section. Many commenters made remarks 
about Middle Eastern culture being generally oppressive of women. This 
claim was used as a way of explaining how ISIS members were able to 
justify their behavior. 
“It is not acceptable, and it is archaic and barbaric that anyone in 
modern times is subjected to slavery. Those that still participate 
in this show themselves to be ignorant and less than human and 
as such do not deserve to survive. Cultures, religions and belief 
systems that think any subjection of others is acceptable should be 
wiped out and do not deserve a place in this world.”
*Response: “Like western pornographers? Lol
*Response: “I think you will find that pornography is 
worldwide and prolific in the East and in Asia, and not 
confined to the West. Most of it is also consensual with 
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payments and choices made. We however in the UK are 
dealing with a plethora of Muslim and Asian pedophile rings. 
Or I suppose you will deny this exists along with the culture 
of marrying off 8-year-old girls! Or the Saudi preference for 
young boys.” – UK, Slave Market
“It’s common sense to know that women are treated like gods in 
the Middle East.”
*Response: “And they aren’t there? Lol”
*Response: “They won’t be stoned to death for being raped...
use that as a cornerstone for your argument and it gets easier 
from there.”
*Response: “Wow since you are compelled to speak what you 
have no idea about. Then. So, you are from Kentucky. And you 
are in a relationship.”
Several comment trends presented themselves according to video and 
region. Today is the Female Slave Market Day in ad-Dawlah and Promises 
of ad-Dawlah to Women garnered responses unique to their respective 
content, and some commenters had slightly different things to say 
depending on the social and political goings-on of the countries from 
whence they responded. 
Comment Trends Specific to the Today is the Female Slave Market Day in 
ad-Dawlah video
The Slave Market ad provoked more disagreements and more emotionally 
charged language (mostly anger and disgust) than the Promises ad. In 
keeping with the female-focused comments, there was a small trend 
of commenters pointing out feminisms, particularly western feminism’s 
alleged failure to recognize or help the women who’d been enslaved by 
ISIS. The International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE) 
researchers noticed this trend last year as well when the same videos 
were shown to other English speakers, and some French speakers. 
Examples:
“Where’s the feminists fighting for these girl’s equality?” – 
Australia, Slave Market
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“Why aren’t all these feminists crying out about this instead 
of claiming sexual harassment every time a man looks in their 
direction” – UK, Slave Market
Additionally, many commenters were confused and upset by the fact 
that the defector emphasized the religion of the enslaved women. To 
the viewers, it appeared the defector used women’s Islamic status as 
the determining factor in whether mass rape and enslavement was 
acceptable. Commenters therefore concluded this meant the defector was 
fine with enslaving non-Muslim women. 
“Negative Category” – Comments Expressing Dislike towards the Video, 
Characters Featured in the Video or the Campaign in General 
 
“The guy seemed more upset that it was MUSLIM women being 
sold into slavery. I’m sure if it was some Christian or Jewish 
[expletive] he would have found that halal. What a disgusting 
ideology.” – Canada, Slave Market
“So... No one has a problem with them enslaving Jewish and 
Christian sex slaves... just the Muslims. I have no words.” – U.S., 
Slave Market
“He is questioning if Muslim women can be taken as slaves, if she’s 
non-Muslim, it’s cool though” – Canada, Slave Market
“Well he seemed to only have an issue with Muslim women being 
sex slaves. Not just because sex slaves in general is wrong. Wtf? 
Seriously?” – Australia, Slave Market
“He seemed only concerned that they were Muslim women. That’s 
troubling also. Nobody should be sold as a Slave. Sex or labor.” – 
Canada, Slave Market
“Notice he’s only if saying [sic] it’s not ok to have “Muslim women” 
as slaves. He doesn’t refer to all women in general.” – U.S., Slave 
Market
“I like how it was that they were Muslims he took issue with. It 
wasn’t that they were enslaving people. No, he felt bad only 
because they were Muslims.” – Canada, Slave Market
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“Supportive Category”—Comments in Support of the Video, Characters 
in the Video, or the Campaign in General
 
“I just love how this guy telling the story proves that they don’t 
all believe this is the way of life “this isn’t right –Australia,” Slave 
Market
Comment Trends Specific to the Promises of Ad-Dawlah to Women Video
While the Promises ad also provoked some arguments in the comment 
section, most commenters agreed that the subject of the video – Laura 
Passoni – was in their opinions: unintelligent, laughable, and to be shown 
no sympathy. This was by far the greatest trend specific to this video.
“Negative Category”—comments expressing dislike towards the video, 
characters featured in the video or the campaign in general 
“That’s what you get for joining a terrorist organization, no 
sympathy whatsoever” – UK, Promises
“Traitor.” – Canada, Promises
“Oh, come on. My boyfriend dumped me, so my next logical step is 
to join ISIS?” – Canada Promises
“Hard to have sympathy for a moron.” – Canada, Promises
“What a [expletive] moron.” – U.S., Promises
“This woman is a lying piece of expletive! Trying to gain sympathy 
because she was caught out, she should receive a bullet to the 
head along with anyone else who returns from Syria/Iraq etc.” – 
UK, Promises
“By this video they try to justify what she has done by showing her 
naive but joining a brutal terrorist group by itself is a crime against 
humanity. If she was offered what she was promised, then she 
was going to continue supporting IS? No sympathy towards those 
beaches at all .” – UK, Promises
“Why is she not in prison with [her husband]?” – Canada, 
Promises
There were some comments expressing sympathy or understanding. 
However, while there were more sympathetic comments for Laura than 
for the male defector in the Slave Market video, they were still sparse. 
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“Supportive Category”—Comments in Support of the Video, Characters 
in the Video, or the Campaign in General
 
*In response to someone insulting the defector’s 
intelligence:
“What part did you not understand when she said she was 
depressed and vulnerable?????” – Canada, Promises
“I feel what she saying let her man do four years get out and prove 
everybody wrong life’s f***** up a f*****-up Journey at times.... I 
believe her. we’ve all made f*****-up decisions in life...”S – U.S., 
Promises
Why Do the Two Videos Receive Different Reactions?
First, each video has a different focus. In Promises of Ad-Dawlah to 
Women, the defector spoke primarily of her own mistreatment by ISIS. 
Furthermore, her most emphasized suffering was because of being misled. 
In Today is the Female Slave Market in Ad-Dawlah, the defector discussed 
the mistreatment of slave women by ISIS, and the emphasis was on sexual 
enslavement – a circumstance graver and more graphic than what was 
discussed in Promises. 
Second, each defector’s gender, ethnicity, and nationality must be taken 
into consideration. The defector in the Slave Market video was a Syrian 
(Arab) male. His ethnicity might have made it easier for the audience to 
view him as a representation of all Middle Eastern people and, therefore, 
Middle Eastern culture. Likewise, his gender (male) might have made it 
easier for the audience to view him as predatory or aggressive. 
However, since the defector in the Promises video is a female, it might 
have been easier to perceive her as a “stupid” or “vulnerable” individual 
who was taken advantage of rather than mal-intended. Since these videos 
targeted the Western world (Australia included), Laura being white and 
European might have also prompted some cognitive dissonance in the 
viewers; it would be less upsetting to think of her as an unintelligent 
exception to – as opposed to a representation of – the population to 
which the audience otherwise belongs. 
Regional Comment Trends
Both ICSVE videos were called propaganda by viewers across regions, but 
the UK dominated this trend overall. One possible reason for this is that 
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Muslims make up a greater percentage of the overall population in the 
UK (territories targeted) than in the US, Canada, or Australia. Arguably, 
Europe is also much closer to the Middle East and ISIS. Many propaganda-
focused comments accused the videos of being intentional marketing 
against Islam, rather than against ISIS. This is contrary to ICSVE’s objective 
of separating Islam from ISIS (hence the counter-narrative emphasis). 
This may also represent deep sensitivity among UK Muslims who have 
been subjected to UK Prevent policies for over a decade now as well 
as responses to videos made by Research Information Communication 
Unit (RICU) but thinly disguised as other entities productions which may 
make UK Muslims feel suspicious of counter-messaging and feel at times 
that they and their religion are under undue scrutiny and even attack. 
It is actually for this reason that ICSVE researchers decided early on to 
clearly brand their videos so there is no question of who the authors and 
sponsors of the messages are being put forward.
Such sentiments could also be attributed to the fact that most did not 
watch the videos to the end, therefore missing the message that ISIS is 
warping and abusing Islam and selling lies. Despite the defectors both 
saying ISIS was not practicing true Islam, viewers took to the comments 
to tell others not to believe the video. However, as mentioned, it is unclear 
whether these comments were made by innocents or by ISIS supporters 
trying to discredit ICSVE material. It would behoove ISIS recruiters to 
further the narrative that Western entities are trying to eradicate Islam by 
making the religion look bad, and to insist ICSVE videos are full of lies. If 
this is the case, ICSVE ads have successfully reached some of their target 
audience. 
“Negative Category”—Comments Expressing Dislike towards the Video, 
Characters Featured in the Video or the Campaign in General
“Do not believe this propaganda bought and paid for by the west! 
No Muslim would EVER condone this!” – UK, Slave Market
“A liar lies a lie. Lie lie lie” – UK, Slave Market
“Why was this video created and who is behind it? If we find out 
we would know the motives of supporting such a criminal like her 
making her look innocent.” – UK, Promises
“Why the expletive is this propaganda trash on my Facebook 
feed?” – Canada, Slave Market
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The Canadian campaigns had a trend of comments criticizing Canadian 
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, who pulled Canada out of the airstrike 
mission against ISIS, and is outspoken in his support and welcoming of 
Syrian war refugees. 
Below are examples of comments against Trudeau:
“Keep the pieces of expletive in their own country and send 
Trudeau and his bum buddies there also” – Canada, Slave 
Market
*In response to a meme of Justin Trudeau: “By the way, he sell 
arms to Saudi Arabia in billions, which is given to ISIS, and used to 
bomb children’s of Yemen, the money is brought to Canada, the 
act was done by your great grandfathers with the indigenous and 
still doing it, you all are British refugees, so shut up, and stop giving 
arms and ammunitions to Saudi and Israeli regimes to create such 
monsters” – Canada, Slave Market
“And Trudo wants to give these animals a hug.” – Canada, Slave 
Market
“Hope every single one of those disgusting enslaving piles of 
expletive end up dying slowly and painfully and expletive Trudeau 
for accepting /rewarding this culture/ideology it makes me sick 
and filled with pity for those poor girls I can only hope some of 
them will taste real freedom asap.” – Canada, Slave Market
Additionally, the UK and Canada both presented a trend of comments 
expressing concern that Islam/ISIS/refugees were plaguing their 
countries. This was expressed as either fear that Muslims were going to 
take over, or frustration that they already had. The reason this, arguably, 
is not so much a trend for the US is likely because President Trump is 
conservative in his positions on refugees and immigrants, so much so 
that he proposed both the travel ban and “the wall.” In fact, some UK 
Facebook commenters even commended Trump. The reason this is not so 
much a trend for Australia is likely because Australia is farther away from 
the Middle East, and because Australia was the only region to be targeted 
with one video instead of two (therefore receiving only half as many 
opportunities for comments). 
Examples: 
*Sarcastically: “Truly beautiful part of a multicultural and diverse 
society I love it diversity is our greatest strength, and this is an 
insight into Europe in the next 30 years can’t wait”– UK, Slave 
Market 
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“And these are the people being welcomed into Europe” – UK, 
Slave Market
“Oh, great be Happening in England soon. There already walking 
about in England with bedsheets on there head . Same thing 
really.” – UK, Slave Market
“Our [expletive] politicians welcome these vermin with open 
arms hope DTRUMP tweets this then people will see what Islam’s 
about and our borders will close quicker than they do.” – UK, Slave 
Market
Noteworthy Comments
Lastly, there were some comments that stood out as being sympathetic 
in terms of trying to understand either the defectors or other commenters 
with different viewpoints by respectfully asking questions. They were a 
rare contrast to the majority of comments or conversations, which were 
filled with arguments, hatred, fear, defensiveness, shock, and disbelief.
“Supportive Category” – Comments in Support of the Video, Characters 
in the Video, or the Campaign in General
“We are British yes? Our nation’s army has done some terrible 
things, but we cannot say all British people are like that right? The 
crewmembers that did those things, claim to have done those 
things for survival right? Just like Libya, these are war torn nations 
and it is impossible for me to comprehend the things these guys 
are going through to make them react like this, there for I reserve 
judgment. I will Say this though, what all these war-torn nations 
have in common is the fact that our leaders have not provided 
adequate assistance to help them rebuild, there for again I say how 
do we cause the problem and then judge the people in the very 
problem which we, or our leaders rather, created?” – UK, Slave 
Market
“Naive and not educated because I really don’t get it how she 
could believe that she was going to have a better life in a country 
in war. Even for guys that join Isis I really don’t understand it . What 
is the reason? What is the purpose?” –  U.S., Promises
“For all the white people out there, here you go. Especially Britain 
first you bastards!”
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*Response: “Trust me, white people understand they are not 
the standard. It’s not us vs you, it’s us against extremism of all 
forms”
*Response: “you’re a good lad, you’re an exception. I’m on 
about the rest that think Isis are Muslims.”
*Response: “Well said both of yours” – UK, Slave Market
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Similar to other awareness and brand raising campaigns, the purpose 
of our small-scale Facebook ad awareness campaigns was to shed light 
on dangers associated with joining terrorist groups like ISIS, as well as 
protect vulnerable potential recruits inside the United States, UK, Canada, 
and Australia from considering joining. Two ICSVE-produced videos were 
used in the campaigns, namely The Promises of ad-Dawlah to Women, 
which featured the testimony of a Belgian female ISIS defector, and Today 
is the Female Slave Market in ad-Dawlah, which featured a Syrian male ISIS 
defector who witnessed the sexual enslavement of women by ISIS. Our 
Facebook ad campaigns generated a reach of 1,048,133, with 604K video 
views. 
In analyzing our data, we have attempted to apply a combination of 
awareness, engagement, and impact analysis metrics to discern the extent 
to which our interventions achieved its desired effect. As indicated in the 
paper, many discussed the message and the messaging strategy of our 
counter-narratives, as well as challenged extremist narratives of violent 
extremist groups like ISIS. Given the amount of comments generated and 
the fact that there are no established “best practices” in collecting and 
analyzing social media generated data, we decided to group them into 
certain categories and illustrate directly (select few) the nature of each. 
We were able to find and present evidence that our viewers have 
thoughtfully engaged with the content of our videos, including initiated 
debates on women, role of gender in Islam, and other contentious socio-
political issues that often influence and drive violent extremism. That 
said, the results generated represent a short-term measurement of the 
impact of our videos and only allow us to utilize such data to further 
improve our future targeting campaigns, namely by gaining an increased 
understanding of user behavior on Facebook and other social media 
platforms.
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Although we can observe engagement with our counter-narratives, it is 
far more difficult to observe or report any direct cognitive shifts among 
those who support violent extremist ideologies. In discussing the role and 
effectiveness of counter-narratives in fighting violent extremism, some 
authors have observed, “It is possible that some of these counter-narrative 
videos have managed to dissuade individuals from joining or supporting 
extremist groups, but those users are simply not leaving comments like, 
“Great video, really changed my mind! That said, we hope that may in 
fact be occurring. The opinions and comments expressed in the campaign 
suggest the need to further expand our internet ad campaign and engage 
especially with those who may be willing to act as influencers and magnify 
the impact of our counternarratives. 
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Note that counter-narratives, or direct counter-narratives characterize the work 
of our organization. They are used to directly target and discredit terrorist 
groups and their ideologies by using the voices of disillusioned insiders, 
or those who have first-hand experience and knowledge about ISIS. In our 
case, they are purposely not labeled as counter-narratives, so that those 
already engaging online with ISIS propaganda will be likely to also encounter 
and engage with our counter narratives and get a very different message. 
To avoid turning away potential viewers in the vulnerable audiences, the 
videos are named with pro-ISIS or ambivalent names and illustrated with 
ISIS generated footage which then becomes the thumbnail for the video. 
U.S. military psych-ops and Google also weighed in on the issue of naming 
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